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Warding Of Development 




n  Moving control of housing 
approvals to more local levels of 
government can exacerbate NIMBY 
(not-in-my-backyard) behavior.
n  I study how housing production 
changes when towns switch from 
at-large to ward elections for town 
council.
n  After switching to ward voting, 
towns reduce housing permits on 
average by 21 percent.
n  The decline is even larger for 
multifamily housing permits, 
especially in towns with high 
homeownership rates.
n  Ward voting, however, affects 
many outcomes, and can increase 
minority representation in local 
government.
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/20-330/.
Housing construction in the United States has not kept pace with demand. In a recent 
report, Freddie Mac (2018) estimates that 2017 production fell 20 percent short of the 
level required to accommodate population growth and replace dilapidated structures. 
Tis may not only afect housing markets, where costs continue to rise faster than 
incomes, but also slow aggregate economic growth. Accordingly, ways to address this 
shortfall have come to the forefront of the housing policy debate. 
Highly local control of land-use regulation and development approval may create a 
classic NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) problem that reduces housing production. Because 
new development has difuse benefts and concentrated costs—such as congestion, lost 
green space, and construction noise—people may prefer less new housing near their 
residence than would be ideal for the town or region. Moreover, citizens have outsized 
infuence over proposals in their area, and they can use it to keep housing production 
low. At a larger geographic level, towns within a region can use local land-use regulations 
to a similar efect. 
Tese forces are anecdotally strong, leading to recent reforms and policy proposals 
that try to spur housing production by reducing local control of land-use regulations. 
Two examples are California’s requirements for municipal housing production and 
Oregon’s recent prohibition of single-family zoning in most municipalities. However, 
despite the increased attention to the issue, there is little empirical evidence on how local 
control of regulation afects housing supply. 
I attempt to fll this gap in the literature by studying a natural experiment that sharply 
increases the degree of local control within a town. Te natural experiment arises from 
a common reform to elections for town council—a switch from “at-large” elections, in 
which citizens vote for candidates to represent the town as a whole, to “ward” elections, 
in which the town is divided into wards and each citizen votes for a single candidate to 
represent their area. Tis change shrinks each representative’s constituency from the 
entire town to just one ward, providing voters in the ward with more power over their 
representative. Moreover, when an issue arises in a councilperson’s ward, other members 
of the council typically defer to the home representative, providing ward representatives 
with signifcant control over issues in their district (Schleicher 2013). 
My results suggest that towns reduce the number of housing units permitted by 21 
percent afer switching to ward voting. Te efect is larger (38 percent) for multifamily 
units and in towns with higher owner-occupancy rates. It appears that more localized 
control has a large negative efect on housing production. Tis suggests that reforms 
restricting the infuence of local levels of government or small groups of people on land-
use regulation and housing approval could indeed increase housing supply. However, 
note that while switches to ward voting provide a natural experiment for this question, I 
do not consider all the efects of ward representation or claim that it is worse overall than 
at-large systems. 
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Because new housing 
has difuse benefts and 
concentrated costs, 
residents may prefer 
less construction near 
their homes than would 
be ideal for the town or 
region. 
Background on At-Large and Ward Elections 
Towns in the United States generally use one of two methods to aggregate individual 
votes into seats on their council. In at-large elections, each citizen chooses from the same 
pool of candidates to elect representatives who represent the town as a whole. In ward 
elections, the city is divided into smaller wards (or districts) in which each citizen votes 
for a single candidate to represent their area. About two-thirds of towns use at-large 
elections for town council, about 15 percent of towns use a purely ward system, and 20 
percent have some representatives elected at-large and some by ward (Clark and Krebs 
2012). 
Towns are able to choose between diferent election types. In theory, any majority 
bloc—whether defned by race, ideology, or ethnicity—can suppress the representation 
of a minority bloc through at-large voting. For example, a minority representing 15 
percent of the population may not be able to win a seat in an at-large election, but they 
could constitute a majority within a smaller ward. In recent years in the United States, 
the majority and minority have typically been defned by racial lines. Trebbi, Aghion, and 
Alesina (2008) show that majority-white Southern towns implemented at-large systems 
afer African American voting rights were strengthened by the Voting Rights Act, and 
a number of studies have found that ward voting indeed increases the representation of 
racial minorities (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004). 
Accordingly, changes between the two electoral rules have ofen been motivated by 
racial equity concerns. A key 1982 Supreme Court case held that at-large elections in 
Burke County, Georgia, violated the 14th Amendment rights of African Americans in 
the county, sparking a wave of switches to ward voting in the 1980s and 1990s (Rogers v. 
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613.). While there are other reasons towns may switch to ward voting, in 
the 1991 Form of Government Survey from the International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA), 31 percent of the 77 switching towns cite either a court or state 
mandate. An additional 20 percent cite a government initiative, 29 percent a referendum, 
and 21 percent another (unlisted) reason. Importantly, housing markets are rarely cited 
as a motivation for reform, as Hankinson and Magazinnik (2019) carefully document in 
the meeting minutes of several California cities that switched to ward voting. 
Ward systems are more decentralized than at-large, since representation is tied 
to smaller groups of people. Tis leads ward and at-large representatives to face very 
diferent incentives. At-large representatives should be concerned with the average 
opinion of the town, while ward representatives should respond to the average opinion in 
their district. Tis diference is likely important for housing approvals. Within the ward 
containing a proposed development, a higher percentage of people will be afected by 
the project’s concentrated costs than in the town as a whole. Tis means that the average 
opinion of the project in the ward may be lower than in the town as a whole, making 
ward representatives less likely to support housing developments. 
Empirical Strategy 
I study the efect of changing from at-large to ward voting by comparing towns that 
make this switch to other at-large towns in the same county. Because this is an imperfect 
comparison, I also repeat this approach but omit at-large towns that appear to be quite 
diferent from the switching towns on characteristics such as population and racial 
composition. To ft the comparison into a natural experiment framework, I refer to the 
switching towns as the treatment group and the non-switching towns as the control 
group. 
I study the efect of the switch on both regular and low-income housing permits using 
national data between 1980 and 2016. Data on regular permits come from the Census 
Building Permits Survey, and data on low-income units come from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. Information on town voting systems comes from 
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Te number of housing 
units permitted falls 
sharply afer towns switch 
to ward voting. 
Results 
Figure 1 plots the percentage diference in housing permits between the treatment 
and control groups in the years before and afer treated towns switch to ward voting. 
(Te diference between the two groups are normalized to zero in the year before the 
switch occurs, so the fgure shows changes relative to this initial diference). Te two 
groups appear to be on similar trends prior to reforms. However, immediately following 
a reform’s approval, permits fall sharply in switching towns. Tis pattern suggests that the 
reform indeed reduced housing production, and the sharp timing of the drop helps rule 
out other explanations. 

















Years to reform 
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SOURCE: ICMA Form of Government Survey; Census Building Permits Survey. 
NOTE: Circles represent estimates of efect of switching to ward voting by years before reform (negative values 
on the horizontal axis) and since reform (positive values on the horizontal axis). Whiskers represent 95 percent 
confdence intervals. 
Next, I combine the coefcients in Figure 1 to yield an average “before-afer” efect 
of switching to ward voting. Figure 2 shows the results, with estimates for all units, 
multifamily units, and single-family units in the diferent columns. Te frst three rows 
show results that include all at-large towns in the control group, while the next three rows 
include in the control only towns that are similar to the switching towns. 
Te average efect for total units suggests that the switch reduces housing permits by 
about 21 percent. For multifamily units, the decrease is 38 percent, while single-family 
is smaller at 11 percent. Te larger estimates for multifamily could occur either because 
neighbors oppose larger projects more strongly, or because the approval process for 
multifamily is ofen more onerous and could provide more opportunities for a ward 
representative to block a project. When using a matched control group, estimates are 
smaller but tell a similar story. 
Homeowners concerned about negative efects on their property values may particularly 
oppose new development. Indeed, in extensions reported in the working paper, I fnd that 
ward voting has an even larger efect on multifamily units in high-homeownership towns. 
Finally, I fnd some suggestive evidence that switching to ward voting decreases 
permits for low-income housing in high-homeownership towns, but not in other towns. 
Tis is consistent with fndings from other researchers suggesting that the efect of new 
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My fndings suggest 
that policies that aim to 
reduce local control to 
spur housing production 
may be efective. 
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SOURCE: ICMA Form of Government Survey; Census Building Permits Survey. 
NOTE: Circles represent estimates of efect of switching to ward voting. Gray bars represent 95 percent confdence 
intervals. 
Policy Implications 
On the whole, my fndings support conventional wisdom and anecdotal evidence of 
NIMBYism, as this example of increased local control reduces permits for local housing 
by over 20 percent. Tis suggests that policies that aim to reduce local control to spur 
housing production may be efective. 
However, I emphasize two caveats. First, I consider only housing outcomes. Ward 
voting could have other benefts, such as increased minority representation. Second, I 
study a specifc policy, and results may not generalize to every situation. For example, 
similar forces are at play between towns within broader geographic regions, such as 
metro areas or states, but further research should investigate voting regime efects at 
those larger geographic levels. In addition, most proposed reforms consider decreasing 
local control, and I study an increase—it is not clear if efects are symmetric when the 
policy shifs the other way. 
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